295 TC Lh Oe sr easnudl t st hsahto wa ltahragte i ndvi vees rt og er sn cdeo er xe il syt sc obnestiwd eereanb liyn voens tcor re sd’ i tr er lai tai nn cges ii nn pt hr iec iUn Sg at hned EEUU mmaarrkkeett. . I Nn va ems et ol yr, st ha les or ei lni ac no rc pe oorna tcer eodt hi te rrast ei nc gusr iitsy sdt reos ni ggne rf aicnt ot hr se (Us uS cthh aans tt rr aa nn cc hh ee sc. oI un nv et satnodr sC iLnO t dh ee aUl sSi zme a) ri nk et th edior as os steos samger ne at toefrt he xe tfeunntdtihnagnc oi nsvt se sf ot or rCs LiOn tchr ee dEi Ut .r Ta thi ne grse srue lmt saai nl seods mh oowr et hoar t l, easf st esrt tahbel eg li on btahl ef i Un aS nbcui at l dc rroi spi sp, etdh es irgenl iiaf inc caen tol ny iUnS t thhea En Ui nmt ha er kEeUt . mH ea nr kc ee ,t .t hI ne al edvdei tl ioofnr, eol ui arnrcees ui sl tms sohr eo wc otnhsai ts toennl ty oi nv ve er st ti omres ii nn tt hh ee EU market take issuer size into account when pricing CLO tranches. Specifically, tohr eiyn if nr ec qr euaesnet tihs es ui rerres l. i aI nn caedodni t icor ne d, it th rea st itnugdsy adnedmoot hnes rt rfaatcetso rt sh ai nt ct iagshet eonf isnmg aal lnedr lCoLoOs se .nTi nhgi so ef fcf er ec dt iits rsattrionng gsetra nf odra rt hd es bUyS CmRaArsk ea td, vwe rhseerley ii nmvpe as ct ot sr sf usne de mi n gt oc opsrt i coef CLOs tighter when credit standards loosen. Chapter 3: Security design and credit rating risk in the CLO market In Chapter 3, we study the extent to which complexity of a security’s design i2m0 1p 3a c. tTs hr ea t ri ne gs uslht so ps ph ionwg at nh da tr ac toi mn gpcl ea xt ei tryi nogf f oa rsCe Lc uOrti rt ya n’ sc hd ee ss iignnt hi ne dpeeerdi o idm1p9a9c6t s- rating shopping and rating catering behaviors in the CLO market and that this bp er ihoarv ti oo r t hi se dgi lfof ebrael nfti nbaenf oc irael ac nr ids i sa, f tCeLr Ot sh ew gi tl ho bcaol mf ipnlaenx ci ti ya l cchrai rs ai sc. t eWr ies tfiicnsd wt he raet mt h oa rt ec ol i mk epl yl e txo ChLaOvse ddeuaal ls carreed li et srsa tl ii nk eg lsy t thoa nh aav es i nb ge leen csr ue bd ji et crta tt oi n rga. tTi nh gi s sshuogpgpeisnt gs but rather been subject to rating catering. However, in the post-crisis period, we find that complex CLOs were more likely to have one disclosed rating instead of two (i.e., higher likelihood of rating shopping). Overall, we show that complexity Chapter 8 - Summary (English)
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