207 dc oe mp ebni nd ee sn tavl la cr iraebdliet ar raet irnegpsoirnt eoduirn sTaamb lpel e5 ,. 3i r. rTehsep ceoc mt i vbei noef dt hc ree Cd Ri t Ar atthi na tg ams es iagsnuer de the rating. In column (1) of Table 5.3, the odds ratio of the Creditor Friendliness Score is negative and highly significant (with odds of -1.29), indicating that a oo nd de ss toaf nedxapredr ideenvciiantgi oan sitnr ci cr teears reaitni ntgh e( f curret hd ei tro frr formi e nAdAl Ai n)e. sI sn soctohreer dweoc rr de as ,s ief s( tt hh ee mt h aa jno rt iht iys ot fr )a nt hc he et rraenc ce hi vee’ sd cao lml aot er er aol pi st i mi s si sutei cd ri ant ian gm (ocrl eo scerre dt oi t oArA- fAr i)e, nc do lmy ps at ar et ed, to a state that is less creditor-friendly. A result that builds upon the research of Gc ouu entt rai el . s ( w2 0i t1h8 h) iwg hheor schr oe dwi t tohr art i gc hr et sd. i tWrea tfiinngds soi mf fi il ramr rs eas ruel t smwo rhee no pwt iemiins ct il cu di ne s(2ev),ewrael atrdadnochuer,ciosnsutreorl avnardiamblaersket controls in columns (2) to (5). In column Tranche Count and Subordination Level to our model. The coefficient of our key independent variable, Creditor Friendliness Score stays negative and highly significant, with the odds of −1.24 (z-statistics oinfc-l9u.d0i6n)g. We obtain similar results when we include all our control variables, Year fixed effects, in our model in column (5). By including all our controls in column (5), the Pseudo R2 reveals a significant higher explanatory power of 29.6%. Hence, our model is robust when we rotationally include several control variables and these controls explain a significant proportion of variation in our dependent variable, as denoted by the R2. Wo uer ncoowm bmi no ve ed tcor et hdei t orradtei nr egd ml oegai st urreeg rwe si tshi o nt hs oi sneToa bf leea5c .h4 , Ci nR Aw hs iecpha wr aet erley.p lTahc ee credit ratings of DBRS are reported in column (1), KBRA in column (2), Moody’s it nh ec oc lrue md int r(a3t)i ,nSg&mP ei tnhcoodl ou lmo gni e( 4s )( saencdt iFoint c5h. 2i n. 3c) o, wl uemenx p( 5e )c.t Bt ha sa et dMoono do yu ’rs ,r Se v&i Pe wa nodf DBRS consider the creditor friendliness per state, while Fitch and KBRA do not at all. In line with this, in Table 5.4 we observe some remarkable differences between CRAs using ordered logit regressions. For DBRS and Moody’s we find significant Chapter 5 - The Impact of Creditor Protection
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